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ABSTRACT
Article aimed to determine the effect of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) which was proxied through the 
proportion of independent commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, quality audits, and 
family ownership on the cost of debt. The objects of this study were companies listed in Kompas 100 from the 
period of August 2013-January 2014. The method used to take samples of the study applied purposive sampling 
method. Data analysis methods used were descriptive statistics, the classical assumption test, and hypotheses 
test. Based on the results of hypothesis testing that performed by using multiple regression analysis at the 0.05 
significant level, the results of this study prove that the proportion of independent commissioners has a significant 
negative effect on the cost of debt. Also, managerial ownership has a significant positive effect on the cost of debt. 
On the other hand, institutional ownership, quality audits, and family ownership have no significant effect the cost 
of debt.
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INTRODUCTION
The structure of companies’ capital generally 
consists of equity and debt. To obtain such capital, 
there are costs associated with the acquisition and 
compensation to the provider of capital, in long term 
and short term. All of which that should be included in 
management’s judgment in every financing decision. 
Each type of financing raises economic costs for the 
company. The cost of capital is closely related to the 
level of profit that is implied (required rate of return). 
From the perspective of investors, the level of required 
rate of return is the profit level that indicates the risk 
level of assets owned. Meanwhile, for the company, 
the amount of required rate of return is the cost of 
capital to be issued to raise capital. 
Companies must grow and develop, so as 
to fulfil the obligation, among others, to pay debts 
to creditors, both the principal and the interest on 
the debt. However, if the company cannot meet its 
obligations then the company is declared insolvent 
or bankrupt (Bodie et al., 2008). In Indonesia, an 
example of a company that went bankrupt because 
unable to pay the debt is PT Metro Batavia (Batavia 
Air). Batavia Air is declared bankrupt by the decision 
No. 77 of the bankruptcy. Batavia Air is unable to pay 
debts to creditors, the International Lease Finance 
Corporation (ILFC) worth 4.68 million US dollars 
maturing December 13, 2012. ILFC filed a summons 
or warning to Batavia Air for not making a payment. 
However, Batavia Air still cannot pay its debts. So that 
ILFC filed a bankruptcy lawsuit against Batavia Air in 
the Central Jakarta District Court (Yuniar, 2013).
Based on those cases, the problem occurs when 
the management is not able to pay its obligations, 
resulting in the transfer of ownership of assets from 
shareholders to creditors. In the contract on the debt are 
agency problems between shareholders, management, 
and creditors. Management has an obligation to repay 
the principal along with the interest to creditors who 
have a claim on the assets of the company. However, 
management is also contracted by shareholders to be 
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able to provide returns or dividends to shareholders. 
In addition, the loan agreement also regulates the 
maximum dividend to be distributed to the shareholders 
that the ownership structure is maintained to enhance 
the growth of companies and to guarantee the return 
to creditors (Ross et al., 2008).
To minimize the agency problem requires a 
mechanism to increase the confidence of third parties. 
Creditors, the providers of funds, have the need to 
ensure the loaned funds will be used properly and 
efficiently by the debtor. It can be caused by the 
asymmetry of information which the creditor has 
limitations for information and company performance 
(Ross et al., 2008). Therefore, it needs a mechanism to 
accommodate the interests of all stakeholders, namely 
corporate governance.
Corporate governance can be defined as a set of 
rules governing the relationship between shareholders 
and managers, governments, employees and holders 
of other internal and external interests relating to their 
rights (FCGI, 2001). Corporate governance is applied 
to improve the performance and accountability of the 
company to optimize shareholder value in the long-
term by taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders and based on the values  of ethics and 
laws and regulations in force.
Corporate governance in Indonesia began to 
be noticed by the public after the monetary crisis in 
1999 when many companies went bankrupt due to the 
economic conditions are quite bad. Weak corporate 
governance is often referred to as one of the causes of 
the financial crisis in Asian countries (Johnson et al., 
2000). Deteriorating economic conditions led many 
companies are not able to pay off the debt because at 
that time the value of the rupiah depreciated and an 
increase in inflation is quite high. This resulted in an 
impact on many people, as many banks were liquidated 
or merged and many companies are ultimately 
restructuring to be able to continue to operate or even 
bankruptcy. These events give attention to many 
companies to restore confidence to stakeholders.
The presence of Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG) at the time of crisis recovery in Indonesia is 
very necessary, given the Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG) requires good management in an organization. 
GCG is a system that cannot give protection and 
assurance to stakeholders, including the shareholders, 
lenders, employees, executive, government, customers, 
and other stakeholders. Johnson et al. (2000) showed 
that countries with weak legal protection make the 
minority shareholders affected by the crisis more 
severe than countries with strong legal protection.
Measurement of the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG) by the company can 
be proxied by several indicators including managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, independent 
commissioner and audit quality (Juniarti & Sentosa, 
2009). Managerial ownership is the embodiment of 
the principles of transparency GCG. Management 
should manage the company to be transparent so that 
it does not conflict with the interests of shareholders 
(Juniarti & Sentosa, 2009). Yunita (2012) stated that 
the managerial ownership in a company to make 
managers more cautious in making decisions related 
to the debt policy. Manager suppresses  the amount of 
debt to minimize the possible risks that have an impact 
on the decision of creditors in determining the rate 
of return. The smaller the risk that the company will 
make the creditors have a higher degree of confidence 
that affects the rate of return will be set. The impetus 
for triggering the performance of the company’s 
management tried to make it happens to make the 
risk smaller in the eyes of creditors so that ultimately 
creditors will only ask for a small return.
In addition to managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership is also an embodiment of the principles of 
corporate governance. Institutional ownership outside 
the company in a significant number will result in the 
stringent supervision of the management conducted 
by management who made outside the company. For 
the management, the supervision of outside parties to 
encourage the management showed better performance 
and made management in a transparent manner.
Research conducted by Robert and Yuan 
(2009), with a sample of companies listed on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, included in the SDC 
Syndicated Loan Database in the period of 1995 to 
2004, found that institutional ownership reduced the 
cost of corporate debt. The reason was the effective 
monitoring conducted by Institutional to encourage 
management to improve company performance. The 
increased performance of the company makes the risk 
smaller companies so the return desired by the creditor 
will be lower.
In contrast to research conducted by Juniarti 
and Sentosa (2009) as well as Robert and Yuan 
(2009), the research of Yunita (2012), with a sample 
of manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 2008-2010 period, showed a positive effect 
of institutional ownership the cost of debt.  The higher 
the institutional ownership, the higher the company’s 
debt policy. This is due to institutional shareholders as 
the largest shareholder wanted to fund the company 
with debt because they did not reduce their voting 
rights (Yunita, 2012).
In addition to managerial and institutional 
ownership, an element of independent directors in 
the company’s organizational structure consists of 
commissioners from outside the company will work 
to balance the decision-making process, especially 
to protect minority shareholders and other parties 
concerned. Therefore, the proportion of independent 
board is the embodiment of GCG.
The presence of independent board within 
the organizational structure allows the company to 
provide financial statements that have more integrity 
so that creditors can see the company’s performance 
and ultimately affect the cost of debt or creditor 
assigned return rate. Anderson et al., (2003), with a 
sample of family ownership of the database company 
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Lehman Brothers Index 1993-1998 period, shows 
that the proportion of independent commissioners can 
reduce the cost of debt.
Another proxy measure of GCG is the quality 
of the audit. Past research has shown auditors offer 
different levels of quality audit in response to a variety 
of client requests to audit quality. The previous study 
distinguishes the quality of auditors by the reputable 
public accounting firm (big four) and non-reputable 
public accounting firm (non-big four), and there is a 
use of auditor industry specialization as the basis for 
giving value for the quality of audits. Companies that 
have implemented GCG will seek to use qualified 
auditor.
Research by Juniarti and Sentosa (2009), 
with a sample of manufacturing companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 2003-2007 period, stated 
that the greater the quality of the audit led to the cost 
of debt the company becomes smaller. The company 
chose to use reputable public accounting firm (big 
four) because it has a good reputation. To maintain 
its reputation, the reputable accounting firm uses 
better systems, qualified human resources, as well as 
acting more cautious in conducting the examination 
process (auditing). This is seen as a positive thing 
for the creditors because the company is valued 
more transparent, leading to lower corporate risk and 
smaller cost of debt borne.
A study needed to be investigated is the 
ownership of the family and their impact on the 
cost of corporate debt. The prior research stated that 
family ownership affects the cost of debt. Rebecca 
and Siregar (2011), with a sample of manufacturing 
firms in Indonesia Stock Exchange 2008-2010 period, 
found that a large proportion of family ownership in 
a company can raise the cost of debt. Shareholding 
in large numbers indicates the level of control that 
is owned by the company is also getting bigger. The 
controlling shareholder is raising incentives to increase 
private profits and as a result, creditors anticipate such 
risks with higher debt costs. Boubakri and Ghouma 
(2010) gave evidence that family ownership had a 
significant positive effect on the cost of debt.
This study is an extension of previous research 
done by Juniarti and Sentosa (2009). The differences 
of this study with previous research are as follows: (1) 
variables used previous investigators is the proportion 
of independent board, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, and quality audits. While 
in this study, the researchers added one independent 
variable, the family ownership which suggested in 
previous research to add other variables that affect 
the cost of debt. (2) The object of this research is the 
companies included in the list of the Kompas 100 2013 
with the period of August-January 2014. Meanwhile, 
the object of previous research is manufacturing 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange. (3) The 
period of this study takes from the period of 2008 
to 2012. Meanwhile, the previous study period took 
in 2003 to 2007. The period of 2008-2012 indicates 
the actual conditions that are the most relevant to the 
issues observed.
The problems of this study are as follows: (1) 
Is Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is proxied 
by the proportion of independent board, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, audit quality and 
family ownership partially affect the cost of debt? 
(2) Is Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is proxied 
by the proportion of independent board, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, audit-quality,) and 
family ownership simultaneously affect the cost of 
debt?
The purpose of this research is as follows: (1) 
to analyze the effect of Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG) is proxied by the proportion of independent 
board, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, 
audit quality and family ownership partially affect 
the cost of debt. (2) To analyze the effect of Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG) is proxied by the 
proportion of independent board, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, audit quality and 
family ownership simultaneously affect the cost of 
debt.
METHODS
The object of this research is the companies 
included in the list of the Kompas 100 the period 
August 2013 - January 2014. The population in this 
study are all companies listed on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange (BEI) in the study period 2008-
2012. The data used in this research is secondary 
data that the financial statements and annual reports 
of all companies included in the list of Kompas 100 
in the period of August 2013-January 2014 and had 
published financial statements and annual report 
for the period ended  from 31 December 2008 to 31 
December 2012. The testing devices are statistics 
used to process samples of existing data is to use 
statistical tests descriptive, classic assumption test 
(normality test, autocorrelation test, heteroscedasticity 
test, multicollinearity test) and hypothesis testing (test 
the coefficient of determination, f-test, t-test). Tests 
were performed using SPSS (Statistical Product and 
Services Solutions) by using the following research 
model:
COD = a + b1KIND + b2KMAN + b3KINST + 
b4KAUD + b5FOWN+ b6DER + b7SIZE + e
(1)
Where:
COD = Cost of debt (cost of debt) of firm i in year t
a = Constant
b = regression coefficient
KIND = the proportion of independent directors of 
firm i
KMAN = Managerial ownership companies i
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Kinst = institutional ownership companies i 
KAUD = Quality audit firm i
Fown = Family ownership (family holdings)
DER = Debt equity ratio
SIZE = Size of company i
e = Error
The following paragraphs will explain about several 
operationalization variables used in this study.
Good corporate governance is good governance 
of an organization that is based on professional ethics 
in business or work, which aims to create excellence 
in enterprise performance management business 
and service companies, as well as a good institution 
to manage the company aims to increase business 
productivity. The indicators that are taken in the 
measurement of good corporate governance are as 
follows.
Independent board is the organ in charge of 
enterprise and collective responsibility to oversee 
and advise the board of directors, as well as to ensure 
the company implements the GCG. Commissioners 
should not be involved in operational decision 
making. Each member of the board of commissioners 
including the chief commissioner is equivalent. The 
main task of the commissioner is as primus inters 
pres that is coordinating the activities of the board of 
commissioners (KNKG, 2006).
Independent commissioner measured by 
the percentage of the total number of board of 
commissioners (Juniarti & Sentosa, 2009). The 
formulation is
      
(1)
Managerial ownership is a management share 
ownership of the entire share capital of the company 
managed (Gideon, 2005). Managerial ownership is 
measured by the percentage of shares owned by the 
management of the entire outstanding share capital 
of the company (Juniarti & Sentosa, 2009). The 
formulation is 
          
(2)
                                                                                  
Institutional ownership is the company’s 
shares are owned by institutional investors, such as 
investment firms, banks, insurance companies, foreign 
institutions, trust funds or other institutions (Juniarti, 
2009). The term refers to the institutional investors 
who include the management of professional investors 
who invest on behalf of other parties, both individually 
and organizationally (Brancato, 1997 in Juniarti & 
Sentosa, 2009).
In accordance with the above definition, 
institutional ownership is measured by the percentage 
of institutional ownership in the share structure of the 
company as previous studies (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 
2003; Robert & Yuan, 2006; Piot and Missonier 2007; 
Juniarti & Sentosa, 2009; Collins & Huang 2010; and 
Shuto & Kitagawa, 2010). Formulated as
                  
 (3)
Audit quality is measured using the size of the 
Public Accounting Firm (KAP). Companies audited by 
the reputable public accounting firms (big four) in this 
research, produce a high quality audit. On the other 
hand, companies audited by the non-reputable public 
accounting firms (non-big four) produce low quality 
audit. The reputable public accounting firms (big four) 
consist of Pricewater House Coopers, Deloitte, Ernst 
& Young and KPMG.
Audit quality is measured by whether the 
company’s financial statements audited by the big-
four accounting firm or not. Dummy variables are used 
for this proxy is to give a value of 1 if the company’s 
financial statements audited big-four accounting firm 
and the value 0 when the audited financial statements 
of the company by other KAP (Juniarti & Sentosa, 
2009).
Family company, in general, is a company 
majority owned by certain families or their share 
ownership is concentrated in certain families (Ayub, 
2008). Laporta (1999) in Ayub (2008) identified 
family ownership to individual ownership and private 
company ownership (above 5%), which is not the 
ownership of SOEs and enterprises, public company 
or financial institution. Thus, the company kind 
of family ownership is not limited to the company 
placing his family members in the position of CEO, 
directors or other management positions. Companies 
that hire CEOs, directors or managers from outside the 
family members of the owner of the company remains 
categorized as a family type of company ownership.
In a sensitivity analysis, family ownership is 
measured using dummy variables, namely one for the 
company with the family ownership of 20% or more 
and 0 for firms with family ownership of less than 
20%. The use of this measure refers to IAS 15 (revised 
2009) which states that if the investor has, directly or 
indirectly, 20% or more of the voting power of the 
investee, the investor is considered to have significant 
influence. This analysis was conducted to find out the 
presence or absence of significant influence (not just 
the percentage of ownership) of family ownership that 
affects the cost of corporate debt.
This study uses control variables which are the 
firm size  and debt to equity ratio. Debt to equity ratio 
is the percentage of the amount of debt compared to 
equity. Debt to equity ratio is other calculations that 
determine the entity’s ability to pay its long-term 
debt. This calculation compares the total debt to total 
shareholders’ equity. Debt equity ratio also helps 
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determine how well the lender is protected in case 
of bankruptcy. From the perspective of long-term 
ability to repay debt, the lower this ratio, the better 
the company’s debt position (Financial Statement 
Analysis).
Debt to equity ratio is measured by comparing 
the company’s total liabilities to total equity of the 
company at the end of the year. The formula of Debt 
Equity Ratio (DER) is
                                 (4)
Company size is calculated using proxy total 
assets owned by the company at the end of the year. 
This study uses the dependent variable amount of debt 
costs received by the company. Cost of debt is the level 
that should be received from the investment to achieve 
the yield rate required by the creditor or in other words 
is the rate of return required creditors when performing 
fund in a company (Fabozzi in Ayub, 2008). The cost 
of debt includes interest rates that must be paid by the 
company when making loans. Singgih (2002) stated 
that the cost of debt is the interest rate before tax that 
companies pay on their loan provider.
Cost of debt is calculated based on the amount 
of interest expense paid by the company within one 
year divided by the number of loans that generate such 
interest. This is in accordance with the researches of 
Piot (2007); Juniarti and Sentosa (2009); and Rebecca 
and Siregar (2011), which use the company’s debt 
interest rate to calculate the cost of debt received by 
the company. The study also focuses on newly issued 
debt obtained by the company in the current period. 
Thus, the cost of debt can be formulated as
                                                      (5)
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Selection of the sample in this study was 
conducted with a purposive sampling method. The 
sample selection process is based on certain criteria 
that have been set. The sample selection processes is 
based on criteria that are shown in Table 1.
Table 2 illustrates the minimum, maximum, 
average (mean) and standard deviation of each 
variable of the study. Based on test results obtained 
by descriptive statistics 170 observational data (N) 
derived from the multiplication of the number of 
sample companies (34 companies) with the study 
period (five years, from 2008 until 2012).
The results of descriptive statistics for the 
independent variable proportion of independent 
commissioners (KIND), which is the percentage 
of the total number of independent directors on the 
board of directors, based on Table 2, this variable 
has an average value reaches 0.4497 or 44.97%. 
These results indicate that the majority of the sample 
companies have independent directors proportion of 
44.97%. The maximum value of the proportion of 
independent directors amounted to 0.8571 or reached 
85.71%. This shows that the highest proportion of 
independent commissioners of the sample companies 
amounted to 85.71%. Meanwhile, the minimum value 
of the proportion of independent directors amounted 
to 0.1667 or reached 16.67%. This suggests that the 
Commissioner lowest proportion of sample firms is 
17%.
The next independent variable is the managerial 
ownership (KMAN), which is the percentage of the 
number of shares held by the management of the entire 
outstanding share capital of the company. According to 
the Table 2, this variable has an average value reaches 
0.0074 or 0.74%. The minimum value of managerial 
ownership of 0.00 or 0%, it means that there is no 
managerial ownership in the company. The maximum 
value of managerial ownership reached 0.1752 or 
17.52%. This shows that the highest managerial 
ownership of the sample companies is 17.52%.
Institutional ownership is defined as the 
percentage of institutional ownership in the structure 
of the company’s shares. According to the Table 2, the 
average value for the variable institutional ownership 
is amounted to 0.6093 or 60.93%. It shows that most of 
the sample firms on average are owned by institutions 
with a share of 60.93% equity stake in the company. 
The maximum value of institutional ownership may 
reach 0.9980 or 99.80%. This shows that the highest 
the highest institutional ownership of the company 
amounted to 99.80% of the samples. The minimum 
value of institutional ownership amounted to 0.0585 
or 5.85%. This suggests that institutional ownership 
is the lowest of the sample companies amounted to 
5.85%.
Results of analysis using descriptive statistics 
on the variable quality of the audit showed a minimum 
value of 0, and the maximum value of 1. The average 
value is 0.6412 with a standard deviation of 0.4811. 
Based on Table 2, the variable has an average value 
of 0.6412 or 64.12%. This suggests that the bulk of 
the sample of companies is audited by the reputable 
public accounting firms (big four). 
Family ownership is defined as a company 
that is majorly owned by certain families, or their 
share ownership is concentrated in certain families. 
Based on Table 2, this variable has an average value 
of 0.2647 or 26.47%. This shows that 26.47% of the 
sample company is a family company. The maximum 
value of family ownership is equal to 1. This suggests 
that family ownership in the company sample of 20% 
or more while the minimum value of family ownership 
is at 0. This indicates that there is no ownership of the 
family in the sample companies.
Furthermore, the results of descriptive statistics 
for the variables debt to equity ratio show the average 
value of 3.2176 or 321.76%. These results indicate that 
the average sample company using debt as a source of 
funding for the operational activities of the company 
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Table 1 Sample Selection
Description Amount
Companies included in the list of  Kompas 100 period August 2013-January 2014 100
Companies that do not publish financial statements and annual reports to the full in the period 2008-2012 39
Companies that do not have the interest expense and interest bearing debt during the period 23
The company's financial statements are presented in foreign currencies, other than Rp 4
Total Companies 34
The time period 2008-2012 five-year analysis 5
The total number of samples during the study period 170
Source: Results from Self-Calculation
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Test Results
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
KIND 170 ,1667 ,8571 ,4497 ,1067
KMAN 170 ,0000 ,1752 ,0074 ,0253
KINST 170 ,0585 ,9980 ,6093 ,2174
KAUD 170 ,0000 1,0000 ,6412 ,4811
FOWN 170 ,0000 1,0000 ,2647 ,4425
DER 170 ,2145 17,6567 3,2176 3,6862
SIZE 170 18502257139 6,35619E+14 6,49276E+13 1,22791E+14
COD 170 ,0034 ,1772 ,0777 ,0378
Valid N (listwise) 170     
Source: Secondary Data Processing Result
compared with stocks. In addition, it also indicates that 
the degree of preference for companies in Indonesia to 
external financing using debt is quite high. The average 
for the size of the company as measured by total assets 
amounted to 64,927,570,260,336,-. This shows that 
the average total assets of the sample companies above 
Rp 10 trillion. The maximum value of the company’s 
size as measured by total assets amounted to Rp 
635,619,000,000,000, -. While the minimum value of 
the size of the company is Rp 18,502,257,139, -.
Based on Table 2, it is known that the average 
COD (cost of debt), which is owned by the company 
samples amounted to 0.0777 or 7.77%. This indicates 
that the company’s average sample loan has an interest 
rate 7.77%. The maximum value of COD is 17.72%. 
The minimum value COD is 12.34%.
Table 3 Test Results Statistics t
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) ,100 ,015  6,464 ,000
KIND -,068 ,028 -,191 -2,400 ,018
KMAN ,253 ,108 ,170 2,352 ,020
KINST ,020 ,014 ,116 1,436 ,153
KAUD ,001 ,006 ,009 ,112 ,911
FOWN -,002 ,006 -,019 -,261 ,795
DER ,001 ,001 ,050 ,575 ,566
SIZE -1,191E-16 ,000 -,387 -4,440 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: COD
Source: Secondary Data Processing Result
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Table 3 shows the results of the t-test between 
independent variables and control variables on the 
dependent variable. The variable proportion of 
independent commissioners (KIND) has t-count of 
-2.400 with a significance level of 0,018 or 1.8%. The 
significance level is less than 0.05 or 5%. The resulting 
value is a negative beta of -0.068, which means H1a 
is received. Thus, it can be said that the proportion of 
independent commissioners significant negative effect 
on the cost of debt. This suggests that the presence 
of independent directors will lower the cost of debt. 
Managerial ownership variable (KMAN) has t-count 
amounted to 2,352 with a significance level of 0,020 
or 2%.
The significance level is less than 0.05 or 5%. 
The beta value generated was positive amounting to 
0,253, which means H2a is rejected. So it can be said 
that managerial ownership a significant positive effect 
on the cost of debt. Institutional ownership variable 
(KINST) has t-count of 1.436 with a significance level 
of 0.153, or 15.3%. The significance level is greater 
than 0.05, or 5%, which means H3a rejected so that 
it can be said that the proportion of independent 
commissioners did not significantly affect the cost 
of debt. Variable quality audit (KAUD) has t-count 
0.112 with a significance level of 0.911, or 91.1%. The 
significance level is greater than 0.05, or 5%, which 
means H4a rejected. So it can be said that the quality 
of the audit no significant effect on the cost of debt. 
The variable of family ownership has t-count of -0.261 
with a significance level of 0,795. The significance 
level is higher than 0.05, which means H5a is rejected. 
Thus, it can be said that the family ownership has 
no significant effect on the cost of debt. Variable of 
Debt Equity Ratio (DER) has t-count of 0.575 with 
a significance level of 0.566, which means Ha is 
rejected. This suggests that the debt to equity ratio 
did not significantly affect the cost of debt. Variable 
size of the company (firm size) had t-count of -4.440 
with a significance level of 0.000. The resulting value 
is a negative beta of -1,191E-016 which mean Ha is 
accepted. So it can be said that the size of the company 
(firm size) has a significant negative effect on the cost 
of debt.
Thus, from the t-test results in Table 3, the 
regression equation is:
Y = 0,100 0,068KIND + 0,253KMAN + 0,020 0,068KINST 
+ 0,001KAUD - 0,002FOWN + 0,001DER – 1,191E – 16SIZE + e      (6)
The variable proportion of independent 
commissioners (KIND) in Table 3 shows a negative 
coefficient of -0.068 with a significance level of 
0.018 which is smaller than α = 5% (0.018<0.05). 
The significance level is smaller than α = 5%, thus it 
is proved that H10 is rejected while H1a is received. 
In other words, the hypothesis test result shows that 
the proportion of independent commissioners has 
significant negative effect on the cost of debt. The 
results support the research conducted by Anderson 
et al. (2003), Robert and Yuan (2006), Piot (2007), 
and Agustiawan (2012). This may be due to the 
independent board within the organizational structure 
led the company’s financial statements to provide more 
integrity so that creditors can see the performance of 
the company. This ultimately affects the cost of debt 
or rate of return set by the creditor. Anderson et al., 
(2003), proved that independent commissioners 
negatively affect the cost of debt, which means that 
an independent commissioner inversely proportional 
to the cost of debt. According to him, in the act of 
monitoring, independent directors can consider the 
effectiveness of supervision over the board of directors 
and audit committee as a guarantee of the integrity of 
the value in the financial statements.
Managerial ownership variable (KMAN) in 
Table 3 shows the positive coefficient of 0.253 with a 
significance level of 0.020 which means greater than 
α = 5% (0.020<0.05). The significance level smaller 
than α = 5% proves that H20 and H2a are rejected or, 
in other words, the hypothesis test results indicate that 
managerial ownership has a significant positive effect 
on the cost of debt. This result is consistent with the 
result of the research by Agustiawan (2012) as well 
as Shuto and Kitagawa (2010). This could be due to, 
in addition to the conflict between shareholders to the 
manager, the conflict between creditors with managers, 
shareholders in the company, is one of the conflicts 
that could occur within the company. The manager, as 
a shareholder, has an incentive to maximize the returns 
to be obtained through investment and financing 
decisions on the burden borne by the creditor. This 
happens because the responsibility of shareholders is 
limited. For example, shareholders have an incentive 
to invest in projects that are at higher risk than specified 
by the creditor. Thus, creditors bear the losses are 
greater when the investment company has failed and 
an experienced corporate debt default. Furthermore, 
shareholders also have the incentive to make the 
transfer of wealth through financing activities, such as 
excessive dividend payments. In an efficient market, 
the rational lender incentives should know this. As a 
result, they will adjust the return obtained so that the 
cost of corporate debt is higher.
Institutional ownership variable (KINST) 
in Table 3 shows the positive coefficient of 0.020 
with a significance level of 0.153 which means it is 
greater than α = 5% (0.153>0.05). The significance 
level greater than α = 5% proves that H30 is received 
while H3a rejected or, in other words, the hypothesis 
test results show that institutional ownership does 
not affect the cost of debt. It can be due to the major 
types of public company in Indonesia is still a 
family-owned company so that their monitoring by 
the institutional tend not affect the decision of the 
lender in determining the company’s cost of debt. The 
existence of institutional ownership in a company is 
considered to provide monitoring action against the 
management. But if it is not accompanied by a serious 
lack of action in implementing the principles of good 
corporate governance, the number of institutional 
ownership does not guarantee in reducing the risk of 
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the company.
Variable quality audit (KAUD) in Table 3 shows 
the positive coefficient of 0.001 with a significance 
level of 0.911 which means greater than α = 5% 
(0.911>0.05). The significance level greater than α = 
5% is proved that H40 is received while H4a rejected 
or, in other words, the hypothesis test results indicate 
that the quality of the audit no significant effect on the 
cost of debt. The results are consistent with research 
conducted by Agustiawan (2012) which shows that the 
quality does not significantly influence the cost of debt. 
According to Agustiawan (2012), companies choose 
to use big-four accounting firm because it has a good 
reputation but not directly result in the cost of small 
debt. The financial statements audited by the big-four 
accounting firm does not guarantee the company’s 
cost of debt to be getting smaller.
Variable family ownership (FOWN) in Table 
3 shows a negative coefficient of -0.002 with a 
significance level of 0,795 which means greater than 
α = 5% (0.795>0.05). For the significance level to 
be greater than α = 5% proves that H50 is accepted 
and H5a is rejected, or in other words the hypothesis 
test results show that family ownership does not 
significantly influence the cost of debt. The results are 
consistent with research conducted by Ayub (2008) 
and Rebecca and Siregar (2012). This may be due to 
agency problems between managers and shareholders 
can be reduced in the company with ownership of the 
family, despite the agency problem between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. In other words, 
agency problem between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders that commonly occur in firms 
with family ownership gives greater risks to investors 
than a creditor that is likely to affect the decision of 
shareholders or prospective investor and not unduly 
influence the decision of creditors. Research by 
Rebecca and Siregar (2011) suggested that family 
ownership does not significantly influence the cost 
of debt. According to them, agency problem between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders that 
commonly occur in firms with family ownership 
provides a greater risk to investors than the creditors 
that are likely to influence the decision of shareholders 
or potential investors and does not unduly influence 
the decision of creditors.
Control variables of Debt to Equity Ratio 
(DER) in Table 3 shows the positive coefficient of 
0.001 with a significance level of 0.566, which means 
greater than α = 5% (0.566>0.05). The significance 
level that is greater than α = 5% proves that the debt 
to equity ratio variables did not significantly affect the 
cost of debt. This is possible because lenders assume 
that the management can take action manipulation by 
increasing the equity of the company. The greater the 
equity of the company compared to the debt you have, 
the smaller the debt to equity ratio. Therefore, lenders 
do not just use the leverage ratio in considering 
investment decisions taken.
The size of the company (Firm Size) in Table 
3 shows a negative coefficient of -1,191E-16 with a 
significance level of 0.000, which is smaller than α = 
5% (0.000< 0.05). The significance level that is smaller 
than α = 5%  proves that the size of the company’s 
significant influence negatively on the cost of debt 
received by the company. The results are consistent 
with research conducted by Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003), Chen and Jian (2006), Shuto and Kitagawa 
(2010), and Rebecca and Siregar (2011). The greater 
the total assets owned by the company, the greater the 
ability of the company to pay off its liabilities in the 
future so that the risk of company defaults will decline. 
As a result, the cost of debt incurred by the company 
will be lower.
CONCLUSIONS
This study aims to determine the effect of 
Good Corporate Governance (GCG) proxied by 
the proportion of independent board, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, audit quality, 
and family ownership towards the cost of debt to the 
companies included in the list of Kompas 100 in the 
period of August 2013-January 2014.
Based on the data collected and testing that 
was performed against 34 sample companies using 
multiple regression models, it can be concluded that 
(1) Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is proxied 
through the proportion of independent commissioners 
has a negative significant effect  on the cost of debt, 
managerial ownership has a positive significant effect 
on the cost of debt, institutional ownership has no 
significant effect on the cost of debt, quality audits did 
not significantly affect the cost of debt and ownership 
of the family does not have a significant effect on 
the cost of debt. (2) Good Corporate Governance is 
proxied through the proportion of independent board, 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit 
quality, and family ownership significant to the cost 
of debt.
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